The implementation of judgments constitutes one of the pillars of the Rule of Law and is inextricably linked to the quality of the administration of justice. From this starting point and keeping in mind that selective enforcement results in selective justice, the present paper focuses on the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The paper attempts to look into the complex question of the binding effect that judgments have on Member States. Is the effect actually binding or does it on occasion remain "wishful thinking"? The study aims at examining the interrelated dimensions of the above-mentioned issue. To this end, it is divided into five parts. The first one focuses on pertinently presenting the existing implementation mechanism of the ECtHR’s judgments and reflecting on the role assumed by the political bodies engaged in the process. The second part examines the evolution of the implementation mechanism under the prism of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The third part is concerned with the underlying causes relating to the problem of defective or non-implementation including the ones encountered in interstate affairs. In the fourth part emphasis is put on the impact of the implementation of ECtHR judgments in the Greek legal order, as well as on reasoning on the way the supranational legislative text has affected the domestic practice and legislation, while adducing specific examples. In view of the fact that slow or non-implementation is a sore point in the Convention’s system, the study finally contemplates on potential means of amelioration that could endorse the effectiveness of the implementation system.
